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Bargaining rationale for cooperative
generic advertising  
John M. Crespi and Jennifer S. James  
The beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of commodity advertising means that beneﬁts to one 
commodity from advertising come at the expense of  other commodities. The effect 
can be mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by Alston, Freebairn and James 
(AFJ). A drawback to AFJ’s analysis is that some cooperative outcomes require side 
payments from one producer group to another. This paper offers a bargaining solution as 
an alternative to cooperation in the case where cooperative side payments would be 
needed. We show that while bargaining without side payments is not as effective as 
cooperation at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it is a welfare improving alter­
native to non-cooperation and is likely more practical in many situations. 
Key words: cooperative and non-cooperative solutions, excessive advertising, mandated 
commodity promotion programs, Nash bargaining, US beef and pork. 
1. Introduction 
Generic advertising has become one of  the most contentious issues in 
agricultural policy. In the past decade alone, three cases challenging the 
Constitutional validity of generic advertising programs have been heard by 
the US Supreme Court (see Crespi (2003) for a history and rationale behind 
the litigation). Although hundreds of studies show beneﬁts to growers from 
commodity promotion exceeding the costs (see the review and discussion of 
studies in Kaiser et al. (2005), for example), many farmers mistrust the 
marketing boards that oversee the programs and question whether the beneﬁts 
reach all farmers. As a result, the courts have taken an interest in distributional 
aspects both within and across programs. 
Partly in response to the controversy, agricultural economists have begun 
to look beyond the ‘ﬁrst-order’ impacts of the marketing programs on the 
farmers who fund them and, increasingly, into the second-order, or distributional 
effects of generic advertising. One strand of the literature on second-order 
effects focuses on how generic advertising affects different groups of farmers 
     
within a program (Chung and Kaiser 2000; Crespi and Marette 2002, 2003). 
This present analysis contributes to a second strand of the literature, which 
focuses on how advertising by one program affects producers in a competing 
program (Alston et al. 2000, 2001). However, as we discuss later, the implications 
may also be useful to within-program distributional issues of the ﬁrst strand. 
Most discussion and examples are provided in the context of US legislation 
and producer groups, but the policy issues translate to levy-funded advertising 
conducted by Australian producer groups. 
Alston, Freebairn and James (AFJ) (2001) showed that if  commodity 
promotion programs across industries could cooperate in the setting of their 
advertising expenditures, the programs could overcome a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
effect, in which one commodity group beneﬁts at the expense of the other. In 
the case where commodities are substitutes, for instance, an advertising-induced 
increase in the demand for peaches may come at the expense of pear consump­
tion and vice versa. AFJ demonstrated that by cooperating in the setting 
of advertising expenditures, producer groups in the cooperating industries 
could earn more proﬁt. 
AFJ optimised the aggregated proﬁt functions of the cooperating producer 
groups without restricting the distribution of proﬁts. As such, there exists a 
likelihood that one producer group would gain more from the cooperative 
advertising, or even that one producer group could lose revenue. In order for 
the cooperative advertising to be feasible, AFJ proposed using lump-sum 
transfers or ‘side payments’ from gainers to losers such that all groups enjoy 
a net gain from cooperating. For example, if peach and pear growers cooperated 
in setting advertising quantities for their two industries and pear growers 
earn less proﬁt by cooperating, they would need to be compensated with side 
payments from the peach growers. In fact, in AFJ’s simulation example com­
paring non-cooperative and cooperative models of beef and pork advertising, 
although aggregate proﬁts were higher, cooperative advertising made pork 
producers worse off  unless they received a lump-sum transfer from the beef 
producers. Hence, without such a payment, there would be no reason for the 
pork producers to enter into an agreement that would lead to cooperative 
advertising. 
The need for such side payments is, in fact, well established in the literature 
on cartel formation. If  ﬁrms in a cartel have asymmetric costs, for example, 
Schmalensee (1987) demonstrates that joint proﬁt maximisation necessarily 
dooms a cartel to failure unless side payments exist, the ﬁrms are merged, or 
members are prevented from deviating from the cartel. 
As AFJ showed, if  side payments were allowed, all of  the programs 
operating under a cooperative advertising venture could be made better off 
than if the programs continued to advertise independently. However, a problem 
in the US context is that side payments are not allowed under the generic 
advertising legislation. For example, the Almond Marketing Order (1950) that 
allows the Almond Board of California to assess growers in order to pay for 
generic almond advertising stipulates that any funds not used for almond 
   
 
promotion, almond research or to cover the Board’s administrative activities 
pertaining to almond promotion or research must either be returned pro rata 
to almond handlers or used to reduce the assessments on almonds in the next 
crop year (§981.81). Other US checkoff legislation includes similar stipulations. 
Even if transfers were to be made legal in the US, we surmise that politically 
they would still be very difﬁcult for a board made up of industry players to 
achieve without grower member distrust. Indeed, even within a marketing 
order that covers only one commodity, squabbles over redistribution of 
assessment funds have led to serious breakdowns. As Crespi (2003, p. 301) 
discusses, one impetus for the litigation over almond promotion came from 
the Almond Board’s decision to reimburse assessments paid by one almond 
handler while refusing reimbursements to other handlers. If  such decisions 
lead to litigious antagonism within an industry, one can conjecture that the 
discord would be magniﬁed when transferring funds from one industry to 
another. 
Given the power of AFJ’s results but the practical difﬁculty of side payments, 
it is worth considering other ways boards could cooperate to make producers 
better off  than they are under the current beggar-thy-neighbour advertising 
battles. One alternative is the horizontal integration of related industries. 
Some multi-industry cooperative marketing occurs on a limited basis. The 
Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation, and the Australian Horticultural 
Corporation provide multi-industry export promotion, for example. Perhaps 
the closest case of  a truly integrated marketing board is the California 
tree-fruit agreement (CTFA). The CTFA is an umbrella marketing and 
research program that facilitates the activities of the peach, plum and nectarine 
programs. However, legally each program is stand-alone and has its own 
board determining assessments and contributes a ﬁxed share to the CTFA 
for generic advertising of stone fruits. By statute, transfers of funds from one 
group to another are not allowed under US marketing order legislation, so 
peach growers can neither fund promotion of plums nor transfer funds to 
nectarine growers, for example. For any of these programs, the allowance of 
side payments from one industry to another or the creation of  a fully 
integrated marketing cartel would entail changes in US legislation. In the 
United States, commodity promotion laws have existed virtually unchanged 
since the 1930s and commodity promotion is arguably one of the most con­
tentious of all farm programs. However, Congress has shown little interest in 
changing the laws and seems to have passed the issue on to the courts who 
review dozens of lawsuits every year. 
We present a ‘second-best’ alternative in the spirit of AFJ’s model that 
increases returns to producers while both mitigating the beggar-thy-neighbour 
effects and leaving unaltered the current checkoff legislation. The key is to 
choose advertising in a manner that embeds, to some extent, the side 
payments necessary for AFJ’s model. Allowing boards to meet jointly to 
bargain over the amount of advertising that each board will perform would 
eliminate the need for overt monetary transfers while complying with current 
     
 
legislation. Current US marketing order statutes do not prevent groups from 
discussing advertising levels with each other. In addition, neither the anti­
trust laws in the Sherman Act nor the restrictions of the Federal Trade Com­
mission Act prevent groups from bargaining over advertising levels. 
In this type of bargaining scenario, for instance, peach growers and pear 
growers might come to an agreement to lessen their advertising intensities so 
as to dampen the beggar-thy-neighbour effects. In fact, the CTFA is a good 
example as the three separate entities may attend and make comments at 
each other’s meetings and share budgets for joint research and promotion. 
While we do not doubt the likelihood that a lawsuit could be brought against 
boards that undertake bargaining over assessments, we do not see any 
legislation that would be undermined by a bargaining solution, especially if 
negotiations are voluntary. The question is how to characterise a bargaining 
solution, and under what conditions would such a bargaining arrangement 
for advertising be stable? 
There are many bargaining models in the economics literature; in the next 
section we discuss why we use the Nash bargaining model and derive the 
necessary conditions for a bargaining outcome in advertising expenditures. 
We then demonstrate the effectiveness of bargaining using a simulation based 
on AFJ’s analysis of the US beef, pork and poultry industries. 
2. Nash bargaining 
AFJ’s article is based upon the observation that the advertising set by one 
commodity board results in decreased demand for substitute goods and can 
impose a cost on other industries. The result is an inefﬁcient use of advertising 
resources in all industries. Coase (1960) argues that agents can overcome this 
type of problem by arriving at a mutually advantageous agreement and that 
this agreement would also be socially efﬁcient (see Samuelson 1985 for a 
theoretical discussion of the relationship between the Coase theorem, bargaining 
theory and cooperative game theory). Thus, private bargaining between com­
modity boards seems a viable means of mitigating beggar-thy-neighbour 
effects. However, there are a variety of models that might be used to model 
the bargaining outcome. 
Many models are based on zero-sum games where the agents are trying 
to determine how some ﬁxed resource should be shared. Roth (1985) and 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) provide overviews of the literature. However, 
in the case of commodity promotion, zero-sum games are too limiting as the 
purpose of the advertising may be as much to increase the size of the market, 
as to alter its shares. Another class of bargaining models examines deals 
struck through repeated trials where agents must worry about the threat of 
deviation and develop trigger strategies to deter cheating, as discussed in 
Rubinstein (1982, 1985) and Gibbons (1992, p. 68). However, commodity 
promotion assessments cannot be altered once they are approved by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and are part of public record, so cheating and trigger 
        
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
                                                       
 
    
 
           
 
  
 
   
   
  
strategies are not necessary components to a model of bargaining in com­
modity promotion. 
In short, we seek a model that allows for boards to either enter into a 
bargain over the amount of advertising they will spend or walk away from 
the bargaining table and continue spending at their current levels. We also 
seek a model that allows for Pareto improvements under the agreed upon 
advertising assessments without need for side payments. Finally, we seek a 
static model that does not necessitate trigger strategies or repeated games 
given that an outside agent holds the boards accountable to the agreed upon 
assessments. Without priors about exactly how the bargaining procedure 
might take place (e.g. will it be a sequential offer procedure, will there be a 
time constraint, what happens when impasses arise?), or foresight concerning 
the bargaining environment (e.g. risk attitudes, bargaining strengths or discount 
factors of the parties), several models could be used to represent the bargaining 
process. The model we have chosen is the Nash bargaining model (1953). A 
beneﬁt of the particular static model of the Nash program is that Binmore 
et al. (1986) demonstrate that this framework can approximate two common 
types of strategic models that use alternating offers. 
In his 1950 work and his 1953 extension, Nash addressed the case where two 
agents bargained over some division that would result in agent 1 agreeing to take 
q1 and agent 2 agreeing to take q2 without need for renegotiation. The sum of 
q1 and q2 does not need to be ﬁxed beforehand, and ‘may also be regarded as 
a non-zero-sum two-person game’ (Nash 1950, p. 155). Nash showed that under 
B Bvery general conditions, the two agents will agree to a pair ( ,  that maximises q q  )1 2 
B Bthe product of the difference between ( ,  and each agent’s next best q q  )1 2 
alternative, provided each difference is positive. The model assumes symmetric 
bargaining power in that all Pareto-improving outcomes are feasible. 
Nash’s solution requires adherence to four axioms in order for an equilibrium 
to be reached: (i) an invariance property that linear transformations of the 
payoff functions do not affect the outcome; for example, arbitrary changes in 
units cannot affect the utility each player receives from the payoffs; (ii) Pareto 
efﬁciency; (iii) individual rationality, such that the solution must not be 
dominated and a player’s payoff must be greater than or equal to her payoff 
from choosing not to bargain; and, ﬁnally (iv) independence from irrelevant 
alternatives, such that the outcome of  a bargain cannot depend on the 
availability of alternative bargains that were rejected when a player had the 
opportunity to choose them. 
Formally, for an n-player problem (see, for example, Gintis 2000, p. 346), 
the Nash Bargaining Theorem states that there is a unique solution 
B B B( , 2 , . . . , q ) = ( f1(S, d1, d2, . . . , dn), f2(S, d1, d2, . . . , dn (S, d1, d2, . . . , dnq q1 n ), . . . , fn )) 
B B Bthat satisﬁes (i)–(iv) and that this solution deﬁnes ( , ,  .  . . , q ) as the vector q q2 n1 
that solves max ∏n 
= 
(π (q ) − π (d )) subject to (q1, q2, . . . , q ) ∈ S where S is thei 1 i i i i n
q , ... ,q1 n 
set of real-number potential payoffs, and (d1,  d2, . . . dn) ∈ S denote the 
agents’ next-best options if  no agreement is reached. There is no incentive for 
any agent to deviate from the unique solution. 
    
 
  
 
        
 
       
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
 
            
 
 
 
  
 
          
 
 
 
     
       
  
             
     
3. Optimal advertising in a bargaining model 
Following AFJ, we consider a model of n goods that are related in demand 
but not supply. Quantities and prices (Qi, Pi for i = 1 to n) are endogenous 
and determined in a competitive market. Ai represents the generic advertising 
expenditure by each of m producer groups where m ≤ n. Demand and supply 
equations for the n goods are thus: 
Q = d P P  , . . . , P , A , A , . . . A ), ( ,i i 1 2 n 1 2 m 
and 
Q = s (PP ),  i i i 
where Pi
P  is the producer price, which differs from the buyer price depending 
on the type of ﬁnancing for the checkoff program: Pi
P 
= Pi, Pi
P 
= (1 – ti)Pi, or 
Pi
P 
= Pi – Ti, under lump-sum, ad valorem, and per-unit funding, respectively. 
As the framework for developing the bargaining solution is similar regardless 
of the ﬁnancing mechanism (lump-sum, ad valorem, per-unit), we motivate 
the model using the bargaining solution under lump-sum advertising as an 
example. Following AFJ, to determine a group’s status-quo position, we deﬁne 
the non-cooperative optimisation problem of producer group i under a lump-
sum funding mechanism as: 
max π = Pd (P , P , . . . , P , A , A , . . . , A ) − ( ( )) − A , TVC Q ⋅i i i 1 2 n 1 2 m i i i
Ai 
where TVCi(Qi(·)) is the total variable cost of  production and the group 
optimises subject to market-clearing conditions (i.e. di(P1, P2, . . . , Pn, A1, 
A2, . . . , Am) = si( Pi
P)).1 
Using AFJ’s notation, the superscript N (non-cooperative) denotes optimised 
N N N N NA A2  , . . . ,
is the optimal proﬁt in the case where the commodity groups choose their 
advertising expenditures independently. The non-cooperative equilibrium for 
the special case of n = m = 2 is shown in Figure 1. The ﬁrst group’s reaction 
function, R1(A2), shows that group’s optimal advertising as a function of 
advertising spending by the other group; R2(A1) is deﬁned similarly. The 
non-cooperative equilibrium occurs where the reaction functions intersect at 
point N. The slopes of the reaction functions are expressed as functions of 
elasticities in AFJ (equation (26)), and are negative for most reasonable ranges 
of elasticity values, provided the products are substitutes. Group 1 makes more 
proﬁt when group 2 spends less on advertising, so iso-proﬁt contours closer 
values when each group acts on its own. Speciﬁcally, π i ≡ π i ( 1 , Am ) 
1 Our modelling of the market equilibrium follows that of AFJ because of the comparison 
we are drawing to that study. However, an equivalent motivation would be to model the decision-
making process in terms of a multistage game as in Zhang and Sexton (2002) whereby the 
board makes its advertising decision in stage 1 and ﬁrms react to this decision in stage 2. 
  
Figure 1 Non-cooperative, cooperative and bargaining equilibria. 
to the horizontal axis represent higher proﬁts for group 1 (and similarly for 
group 2). 
AFJ were interested in the optimal advertising when commodity groups 
could cooperatively choose each member’s advertising expenditure – in other 
words, a cartel’s choice of advertising spending. At points enveloped by the 
reaction functions in Figure 1 (the area with vertical and/or horizontal hatching), 
at least one producer group is made better off  relative to the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Optimisation of the combined proﬁts of the two groups yields a 
point in the single- or double-hatched area, but if  the optimal combined 
proﬁts fall in one of the single-hatched areas, one group will actually do 
worse than in the non-cooperative outcome as illustrated by an example case 
of point C. Hence, as AFJ show, it is in these areas where a group would need 
to be compensated through a ‘lump-sum transfer to compensate the group 
experiencing a loss’ (Alston et al. 2001, p. 895). This observation is consistent 
with Schmalensee’s (1987) result that cartel solutions from aggregated proﬁt 
equations of asymmetric ﬁrms are unstable in the absence of side payments. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
    
  
  
 
 
       
  
 
 
In this paper, we are interested in the optimal choice of advertising among 
commodity groups who agree to undertake a level of advertising expenditure 
under a type of bargaining cartel. Because a group can always leave a cartel 
and act on its own, π i
N  is then the opportunity cost of undertaking any other 
amount of advertising. Because of the Pareto efﬁciency requirement, under 
the Nash bargaining solution, each commodity board must earn at least this 
amount in order to enter into the bargain. In an optimal bargaining outcome, 
each producer group should arrive at advertising expenditures that will make 
its constituents better off  while internalising some or the entire side payment 
amount that might arise under AFJ’s solution – that is, the bargaining 
equilibrium, B, must fall on the locus of tangencies of the iso-proﬁt contours 
within the double-hatched area of Figure 1. 
From the previous section, the Nash optimisation program for the bargaining 
model with lump-sum advertising is then, 
m 
max ∏(π i − π iN ).  
, 2 AmA A  , . . . ,1 i=1 
Deﬁning φ ≡ π − π N, the i th ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Ai isi i i 
m 1 dφ j 
= 0.  
j=1 φ j i ∑ dA 
Solving the maximisation problem under the market-clearing conditions 
and rearranging terms gives us the bargaining solution for lump-sum (B |LS ) 
advertising as implicitly deﬁned by: 
m d ln P φB LS  | j iA = ∑PQ  . (i j j 
j 1 d ln Ai φ j= 
This bargaining solution is very similar to AFJ’s cooperative solution, Ai
C 
(equation (13) in AFJ). The cooperative solution weighs individual PjQj(d ln Pj/ 
d ln Ai) terms by one, reﬂecting the maximisation of a simple sum of producer 
group proﬁts. In the bargaining solution, the j th term is weighted by φi /φj. 
Comparisons between the cooperative and bargaining solutions are similarly 
derived when advertising is funded with a per-unit or ad-valorem check-off; the 
only change is the choice variable (Ti or ti), and, hence, the optimisation program 
that determines π i
N. In the case of per-unit ﬁnancing, π i
N  is the result of the choice 
of Ti to maximise = (P T d  (P , P , . . . , P , A , A , . . . , Aπ i i − i ) i 1 2 n 1 2 m ) − TVC Q i ( i ( )) ⋅ 
subject to the condition that all checkoff funds are spent (i.e. Ai = TiQi) and 
the market-clearing conditions. As above, the bargaining solution from the 
program in Equation (4), but now under the choice of per-unit checkoff 
(B |PU ) ﬁnancing may be derived implicitly as: 
m d ln P φB PU  | j iA = PQ  j . i ∑ j 
j 1 d ln Ti φ j= 
© 2007 The Authors 
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We have written Equation (7) in terms of  the resultant advertising 
expenditure in order to show its similarity with Equation (6). Finally, in the 
case of ad valorem ﬁnancing, π i
N  is the result of the choice of ti that optimises 
π i = P(1 − i ) (P P  , . . . , n , A , A , . . . , A ) − i ( ( )), subject to alli t d  i 1, 2 P 1 2 m TVC Q i ⋅ 
checkoff funds being spent (Ai = tiPiQi) and the market-clearing conditions. 
The bargaining solution for advertising funded by an ad valorem check-off 
(B |AV ) is derived similarly: 
| 
m d ln P φiB AV  jAi = ∑(1 − tj )PQ  j . j 
j=1 d ln ti φ j 
As in the case of the lump-sum advertising result, the cooperative solutions 
for the per-unit and ad valorem programs from AFJ differ from the bargaining 
solutions only by the inclusion of the φi/φj weights. 
It is interesting to consider the implications of  Equations (6)–(8) in light 
of AFJ’s results. These equations show that the cooperative and bargaining 
solutions would coincide if  the producer cartel chose to maximise a weighted 
sum of  producer proﬁts, using φi/φj as weights, giving less weight in the 
determination of advertising expenditures to the price effects in markets 
where producer groups gain more by bargaining. What the bargaining solutions 
offer, then, is a way of embedding the side payments in the advertising outlays 
themselves by adjusting the expenditures in proportion to the relative gains 
from entering into the bargaining arrangement. The φi/φj terms do not reﬂect 
bargaining power, but rather adjust the groups’ advertising inﬂuences on all 
commodities. While aggregate proﬁts can never be higher than under AFJ’s 
cooperative model, all groups are made better off  than they would be under 
the non-cooperative scenario. If  the gains are equal (φi/φj = 1) then Equations 
(6)–(8) revert to AFJ’s cooperative solutions and there is no difference between 
arriving at the optimal advertising by bargaining or joint-proﬁt maximisation. 
Equations (6)–(8) suggest that commodity groups have an alternative to 
both non-cooperation and AFJ’s cooperative model that has the potential to 
increase industry proﬁts entirely through the board’s choice of the advertising 
expenditure and transfers to competing industries need not be considered. 
4. Simulations and comparison to AFJ’s results 
In order to examine the effects of  a bargaining outcome, the numerical 
simulations in AFJ were repeated using the objective functions from the 
Nash bargaining model. Demand functions for beef, pork, and poultry were 
speciﬁed, using the same functional form and parameter values as in AFJ. 
Supply functions were speciﬁed, again using the same functional form and 
elasticity values. The Solver tool in Microsoft Excel was used to ﬁnd beef and 
pork advertising expenditures that maximised the Nash bargaining objective 
functions vis-à-vis the non-cooperative fallback position, subject to market-
clearing conditions. Table 1 provides the results from the non-cooperative, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Effects of funding methods and behavioural assumptions on optimal advertising 
Variable of interest Non-cooperative Beef and pork Beef and pork 
competition producers cooperate producers bargain 
Lump-sum funding 
Optimal advertising expenditure (US$ million/year) 
Beef producers 32.44 23.47 14.99 
Pork producers 13.28 0.00 5.35 
Total beef and pork 45.72 23.47 20.34 
Optimal advertising intensities (per cent of revenue) 
Beef producers 0.06 0.05 0.03 
Pork producers 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Total beef and pork 0.05 0.03 0.02 
Beneﬁts from advertising (US$ million/year) 
Beef producers 246 656 251 
Pork producers 33 –319 36 
Poultry producers –291 –35 –275 
Beef and pork producers 279 338 287 
All producers –13 303 13 
Ad valorem funding 
Optimal advertising expenditure (US$ million/year) 
Beef producers 41.77 31.43 20.72 
Pork producers 21.47 0.00 9.49 
Total beef and pork 63.24 31.43 30.21 
Optimal advertising intensities (per cent of revenue) 
Beef producers 0.08 0.06 0.04 
Pork producers 0.06 0.00 0.03 
Total beef and pork 0.07 0.04 0.04 
Beneﬁts from advertising (US$ million/year) 
Beef producers 248 647 253 
Pork producers 38 –304 41 
Poultry producers –296 –48 –283 
Beef and pork producers 287 343 294 
All producers –9 294 12 
Notes: Values in the ‘Non-cooperative competition’ and ‘Beef and pork producers cooperate’ columns come 
from Alston et al. (2001), table 3. Actual advertising expenditures for 1998 were used to parameterise the 
model: US$25.51 million for beef, and US$13.79 million for pork. 
cooperative and bargaining solutions (the results for the non-cooperative and 
cooperative solutions are from AFJ’s table 3) for two types of funding. 
The results for both the lump-sum ﬁnancing and the ad valorem ﬁnancing 
tell very similar stories. When beef and pork commodity groups set their 
advertising budgets not as a cartel but rather through bargaining, total 
spending on advertising is less than in the non-cooperative and cooperative 
cases. Further, as discussed above, advertising can be seen to be split more 
evenly between beef and pork producers, rather than all advertising being 
conducted for beef, as in the cooperative case. The bargaining model essentially 
‘embeds’ the side payments from the cooperation model within the advertising 
itself. Under a bargaining model with lump-sum ﬁnancing, for example, 
  
  
  
although the beneﬁts from advertising to beef and pork producers combined 
are less than in the cooperative case (US$287 million vs US$338 million), 
they are an improvement over the non-cooperative case (US$279 million), 
with both commodity groups enjoying positive beneﬁts. 
Interestingly, in this example, the optimisation strategy has a pronounced 
effect on poultry producers: the cost to poultry producers of beef and pork 
advertising is reduced greatly when the groups cooperate, but the bargaining 
outcome is only slightly more favourable than for the non-cooperative case. 
While beef and poultry producers beneﬁt from cooperation at the expense of 
pork producers, all three groups beneﬁt from a switch from the non-cooperative 
to the bargaining outcome. 
5. Extensions 
For demonstration purposes, we restricted our attention to the original Nash 
model where each group is assumed to have the same bargaining strength. 
Clearly the simulations demonstrate that an assumption of  symmetric 
bargaining strength does not imply that the gains will be symmetric, as much 
depends upon the market conditions and fallback positions of the parties. 
Nonetheless, our analysis could be extended to a model with asymmetric 
bargaining power provided the degree of  bargaining strength could be 
determined. A simple extension of Nash’s model to allow for an exogenous 
bargaining-strength parameter can be found in Eichberger (1993, p. 255).2 
The result would include the bargaining strength parameters in the optimal 
advertising solutions. 
The bargaining model may also be a very useful tool within a commodity 
program itself. For example, organic producers or producers of particular 
varieties often express a preference to differentiate their product rather than 
to be part of a generic promotion program. Generic advertising of differentiated 
products covered in one marketing order could, likewise, result in beggar-
thy-neighbour effects among members of a commodity group. A bargaining 
arrangement where advertising expenditures are set as proposed here offers a 
practical improvement for allocating promotional budgets for a checkoff 
program. In this case, subgroups could form their own micromarketing 
boards covering their particular commodity and then bargain over the checkoff 
rates or advertising expenditures for these subsets of products covered in the 
macro marketing order. Legislative changes to the checkoff programs would 
be needed to accommodate different rate structures within the program and 
additional costs would be incurred to prevent individual farmers in one 
group from cheating by claiming they are part of another group. The beneﬁt 
2 Speciﬁcally, the solution would be to the following extension of  the Nash model:
n γ imax ( (s ) − π (d ))   where γi represents an exogenous bargaining strength parameter ∏ πi=1 i i i i 
s , . . . , s1 n 
and Σγi = 1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
of  a bargaining framework, though, may be that producer organisations 
would be able to keep all producers under the umbrella of an overarching 
program but allow for adjustments of advertising expenditure by subgroups 
within the program.3 
6. Conclusion 
The beggar-thy-neighbour aspects of commodity advertising, where one 
group beneﬁts from advertising its own product at the expense of  other 
commodities, are mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by 
Alston et al. (2001). The drawback to the AFJ analysis, however, is that some 
cooperative outcomes require side payments from one producer group to 
another. In the US, side payments are practically impossible unless commod­
ity boards and commissions were legislatively granted authority to make 
them. We have shown that while bargaining is not as effective as cooperation 
at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it may be both more feasible and 
perceived as more equitable by commodity groups because all that is required 
is an alteration of advertising spending by each of the commodity boards. 
Since the alteration of the advertising expenditure as shown here will increase 
industry proﬁts, bargaining would be in keeping with a board’s mandate to 
increase grower returns through advertising. Certainly, other decision rules, 
legislative speciﬁcations or board organisations may provide feasible or more 
efﬁcient solutions to the beggar-thy-neighbour problem. The beneﬁt of the 
bargaining process outlined here is that it would require relatively small 
institutional changes. 
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